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Interoceptive fear learning to mild
breathlessness as a laboratory
model for unexpected panic attacks
Meike Pappens*, Evelien Vandenbossche, Omer Van den Bergh and Ilse Van Diest
Health Psychology, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
Fear learning is thought to play an important role in panic disorder. Benign interoceptive
sensations can become predictors (conditioned stimuli – CSs) of massive fear when
experienced in the context of an initial panic attack (unconditioned stimulus – US).
The mere encounter of these CSs on a later moment can induce anxiety and fear, and
precipitate a new panic attack. It has been suggested that fear learning to interoceptive
cues would result in unpredictable panic. The present study aimed to investigate
whether fear learning to an interoceptive CS is possible without declarative knowledge
of the CS–US contingency. The CS consisted of mild breathlessness (or: dyspnea), the
US was a suffocation experience. During acquisition, the experimental group received
six presentations of mild breathlessness immediately followed by suffocation; for the
control group both experiences were always separated by an intertrial interval. In
the subsequent extinction phase, participants received six unreinforced presentations
of the CS. Expectancy of the US was rated continuously and startle eyeblink
electromyographic, skin conductance, and respiration were measured. Declarative
knowledge of the CS–US relationship was also assessed with a post-experimental
questionnaire. At the end of acquisition, both groups displayed the same levels of US
expectancy and skin conductance in response to the CS, but the experimental group
showed a fear potentiated startle eyeblink and a different respiratory response to the
CS compared to the control group. Further analyses on a subgroup of CS–US unaware
participants confirmed the presence of startle eyeblink conditioning in the experimental
group but not in the control group. Our findings suggest that interoceptive fear learning
is not dependent on declarative knowledge of the CS–US relationship. The present
interoceptive fear conditioning paradigm may serve as an ecologically valid laboratory
model for unexpected panic attacks.
Keywords: fear conditioning, panic, respiration, interoceptive fear, CS–US contingency, dual process theory
Introduction
Fear learning to initially harmless cues is considered one of the mechanisms in the etiology
of panic disorder (Bouton et al., 2001; Kessler et al., 2006; Acheson et al., 2012; De Cort
et al., 2012; Pappens et al., 2012). Low-level interoceptive bodily sensations (such as mild
sensations of dyspnea; a slight increase in heart rate; etc.) are thought to acquire fear-evoking
properties because they were once experienced in the context of an isolated panic attack
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(unconditioned stimulus – US). A panic-predictive connotation
is attributed to the cues (conditioned stimuli – CSs), causing
them to trigger anxiety and/or fear on a later encounter. The
successful application of exposure techniques in the treatment
of panic disorder demonstrates the relevance of learning theory
for this disorder. For example, interoceptive exposure to mild
bodily sensations significantly reduces long-term anxiety in panic
patients (McHugh et al., 2009).
An important feature of panic attacks is that they can
occur either ‘expectedly’ or ‘unexpectedly’ (DSM-V). It has been
suggested that especially in the latter case fear conditioning
to an interoceptive sensation is responsible for triggering a
new culmination of fear and fear-related arousal (Vickers and
McNally, 2005; Johnson et al., 2014).
Up until today interoceptive fear conditioning remains a
poorly studied phenomenon, despite the fact that approximately
40% of panic attacks are defined as unexpected (Shulman et al.,
1994). Over the past years, a few studies have investigated
fear conditioning to an interoceptive CS in the laboratory. For
example, Acheson et al. (2007) used 5 s applications of 20% CO2-
enriched air as an interoceptive CS and 15 s of the same substance
as US in a panic-relevant interoceptive fear conditioning design.
In a follow-up study (Acheson et al., 2012) they investigated
discriminatory learning in interoceptive fear conditioning.
Earlier, we successfully established and extinguished fear to
a mild sensation of breathlessness by combining it with a
distressing breathing obstruction and investigated the differences
between exteroceptive versus interoceptive fear conditioning and
the influence of vagal tone on interoceptive fear conditioning
processes (Pappens et al., 2012, 2013, 2014). Together these
studies demonstrated that fear can be acquired to benign
interoceptive sensations and they provided valid experimental
paradigms to study the characteristics of interoceptive fear
conditioning in the laboratory.
An unstudied yet fundamental issue remains whether
interoceptive fear conditioning can happen outside of awareness
as is suggested by its presumable role in unpredictable panic. For
decades, there has been an ongoing discussion in the scientific
community on the necessity of propositional knowledge of the
CS–US contingency as a prerequisite for associative fear learning.
Proponents of a single-process theory of fear learning consider
high-level cognitive processes as the foundation of all associative
learning. As a consequence fear learning is based on propositional
knowledge of the CS–US contingency (e.g., Purkis and Lipp,
2001; Lovibond and Shanks, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2009; Sebastiani
et al., 2011; Newell and Shanks, 2014).
In contrast, a dual-process theory of fear learning describes
one type of learning that leads to declarative knowledge and
another type that activates the fear system without the person
being necessarily aware of the CS–US contingency (e.g., Hamm
and Vaitl, 1996; LeDoux, 1996; Clark and Squire, 1998; Öhman
and Soares, 1998; Öhman and Mineka, 2001; Knight et al., 2003;
Beaver et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2005; Tabbert et al., 2006, 2011;
Weike et al., 2007; Kindt et al., 2009; Raes et al., 2010; Schultz
and Helmstetter, 2010; Soeter and Kindt, 2010). In the past
years, a great number of studies have sought to provide evidence
for the existence of two distinct fear learning pathways. For
example, Beaver et al. (2005) demonstrated fear learning to a
subliminally administered – and thus not consciously perceived-
danger cue (CS+). Also, fear learning to a CS+ was present
in skin conductance responses (SCRs) although it was hardly
discriminable from a CS- (Schultz and Helmstetter, 2010), but
these results could not be replicated (Sevenster et al., 2014).
Clark and Squire (1998) examined startle eyeblink responses in
a classical aversive conditioning study in patients with deficits in
declarative memory as a result of severe bilateral hippocampal
lesions. As expected, the patients were not capable of reporting
upon the CS–US relationship. However, they did display fear
potentiated startle eyeblink responses to the danger cue, which
were probably triggered through activation of the amygdala
(LeDoux, 2000). Also, the intake of propranolol, a substance
blocking noradrenergic release (Kindt et al., 2009) resulted in
a dissociation in fear learning outcomes (self-reported fear and
the startle eyeblink response on the one hand, versus skin
conductance and US-expectancy ratings on the other hand).
In a previous study in healthy participants we also
demonstrated a divergence between different fear measures
in a panic-relevant interoceptive fear conditioning paradigm
(Pappens et al., 2013). The experimental group received six
paired administrations of a CS (a mild feeling of breathlessness)
and a US (a strong feeling of breathlessness) during acquisition.
The control group received the same amount of CSs and USs in
acquisition, but in an unpaired fashion. Extinction was the same
for both groups – it consisted of six CS-only administrations. Our
measures included startle eyeblink responses electromyographic
(EMG), respiratory measures and self-reported fear. While fear
conditioning emerged in startle eyeblink EMG and respiration
in the experimental group only, no group differences occurred
in self-reported fear. Thus, although the experimental group
showed a potentiated startle eyeblink response and an increased
ventilation during the CS, they did not to report more fear
to the CS compared to the control group. These findings
suggest that our interoceptive paradigm is able to install fear
without propositional knowledge of its presence. However,
a direct measure of declarative knowledge about the CS–US
contingency was lacking in the study nor was it possible to
compare participants that were either aware or not of the CS–US
relationship. This limited the conclusions that could be drawn
with respect to the necessity of propositional knowledge to install
interoceptive fear learning or existence of fear learning.
With the current study we aimed to replicate and extend our
previous study. We replaced self-reported fear by a continuous
measure of self-reported US-expectancy (DIAL) and we included
SCRs. Declarative knowledge of the CS–US relationship was
also evaluated post-experimentally by assessing the participants’
knowledge of the experienced contingencies.
Our hypotheses were the following:
We expected to replicate the findings of Pappens et al. (2013)
during acquisition: (a) higher startle eyeblink EMG responses
during the CS than during ITI in the experimental but not in the
control group; (b) less reduction in respiratory frequency and in
tidal volume during the CS load in the experimental compared
to the control group; and we predicted: (c) US expectancy during
the CS load not to be greater for the experimental than for the
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control group. (d) since SCR was not included in Pappens et al.
(2013) and given the mixed results in literature (e.g., Kindt et al.,
2009; Schultz and Helmstetter, 2010; Sevenster et al., 2014) we
held no specific predictions for this outcome measure.
Given the hypothesized role of interoceptive fear learning in
unexpected panic, we expected to observe similar differences
during acquisition in the experimental subgroup of CS–US
unaware participants versus those in the control group: (a) higher
startle eyeblink EMG responses during the CS than during ITI
in the experimental but not in the control group; (b) less of a
reduction in respiratory frequency and in tidal volume during
the CS load in the experimental compared to the control group;
(c) no differences in US expectancy in the experimental versus
control group; (d) again, we held no specific predictions for SCR.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Fifty-six psychology students participated in this study (51
women, M = 19.16 years, range 18–25 years) in return for
a course credit. Persons with a current or past history of
cardiovascular disease, chronic, or acute respiratory disease,
pregnancy, current, or past history of drug or alcohol abuse
or dependence, psychotropic drug use and any current or past
psychiatric disorder including panic and anxiety disorder were
excluded from the study. The study protocol was approved by
the Medical Ethics Committee of the University of Leuven in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. All subjects signed
an informed consent form stating – amongst other information –
that participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw
from the study at any moment.
Stimuli and Apparatus
Stimuli
The CS consisted of a non-aversive linear resistive load of
0.98 kPa∗s/l, whereas an aversive linear resistive load of
3.91 kPa∗s/l served as the US. Resistive loads were administered
during both the inspiratory and expiratory phases of the
respiratory cycle. The CS was presented for 8 s, the US for 30 s
(Pappens et al., 2013).
Breathing Apparatus
A mouthpiece was mounted onto a bacterial filter that was fitted
on a pneumotachograph (Fleisch No. 2, Epalinges, Switzerland).
The pneumotachograph was connected to a non-rebreathing
valve of which the inspiratory and expiratory port were installed
on a three-way Y-valve (stopcock type) using a vinyl tube (inner
diameter: 3.5 cm; length 100 cm). This set-up enabled easy
switching between room air and loaded breathing. The signal
from the pneumotachograph was amplified using a pressure
transducer (Sine Wave Carrier Demodulator CD15, Valydine
EngineeringTM) and was calibrated daily with a 1 l syringe.
Fractional end-tidal CO2 (FetCO2) was measured using an
infrared capnograph (POET II, Criticare, USA) that sampled
expired air from the breathing circuit close to the mouthpiece.
The capnograph was calibrated daily using a calibration gas
containing 7.5% CO2. Air flow and CO2 waveforms were
digitized at 20 Hz.
Skin Conductance
Electrodermal activity was recorded with Fukuda standard
Ag/AgCl electrodes (1 cm diameter) filled with a Unibase
electrolyte and attached to the hypothenar palm of the non-
dominant hand, which was cleaned with tap water before
the start of the procedure. The inter-electrode distance was
2.5 cm. A Coulbourn skin conductance coupler (LabLinc v71–
23) provided a constant 0.5 V across electrodes. The signal was
digitized at 100 Hz.
Startle Eyeblink Response
Orbicularis oculi electromyographic activity (EMG) was
recorded as an index of the eyeblink component of the startle
response with three Ag/AgCl Sensormedics electrodes (0.25 cm
diameter) filled with electrolyte gel. After cleaning the skin to
reduce inter-electrode resistance, electrodes were placed on the
left side of the face (Blumenthal et al., 2005). The raw signal was
amplified by a Coulbourn isolated bioamplifier with bandpass
filter (LabLinc v75–04). The recording bandwidth of the EMG
signal was between 13 Hz and 10 kHz. The signal was rectified
online and smoothed by a Coulbourn multifunction integrator
(LabLinc v76–23 A) with a time constant of 50 ms. The EMG
signal was digitized at 1000 Hz from 500 ms before the onset of
the auditory startle probe (a 95 dB burst of white noise with a rise
time<1 ms presented binaurally for 50 ms through headphones)
until 1000 ms after probe onset.
US Expectancy Dial
Participants were asked to continuously rate their expectancy of
the USwith a custom built dial (Pappens et al., 2012). The scale on
which they had to rate US-expectancy, ranged from zero (“I am
certain that the heavy breathing resistance is not coming now”)
to one hundred (“I am certain that the heavy breathing resistance
is coming now”). The dial produced an analog signal, which was
digitized and stored at 10 Hz (Pappens et al., 2012).
Post-Experimental Contingency Assessment
After the experimental phase, participants were questioned
orally about their knowledge of the CS–US relationship with
the following open question: “can you tell us whether you
detected a certain order in the administration of the different
types of stimuli?” Participants of the experimental group
were categorized as ‘aware’ when correctly identifying that a
light breathing resistance (CS) immediately preceded a strong
breathing resistance (US) and as ‘unaware’ if they could not
verbalize this relationship. In the control group a person was
labeled as ‘aware’ when he/she correctly identified that CS and US
were separated by an intertrial interval (ITI) and as ‘unaware’ if
they did not.
Software
All devices were connected to a PC through a National
Instruments PCI-6221 16-Bit acquisition card (National
Instruments, Austin, TX, USA). Affect 4.0 software (Spruyt
et al., 2010) was used for stimulus presentation and data
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acquisition. Physiological signals were treated off-line
with PSPHA (De Clerck et al., 2006), a modular script-
based program to generate and apply calibration factors
and to extract parameters from each of the recorded
signals.
Procedure
Upon their arrival, the experimenter told the participants
that psychophysiological and subjective responses would be
measured during three different types of breathing trials: normal
breathing, mildly restricted breathing and heavily restricted
breathing. She showed the participants how to continuously
indicate their US expectancy with the online dial. Then
she attached the electrodes and explained that brief bursts
of noise would be administered through the headphones
but that these could be ignored. Following this, participants
took in the mouthpiece and put on the nose-clip and the
headphones.
After the administration of 10 acoustic startle probes (30 s
in between probes) to habituate the startle eyeblink response
the experimental phase was started. Participants received three
CS pre-exposure trials, followed by six acquisition trials and six
extinction trials. Half of the participants were randomly assigned
to the experimental (paired) group, the other half to the control
(unpaired) group.
A pre-exposure trial consisted of a 20 s baseline, a CS (8 s)
presentation and an ITI of 30 s without stimulus. For the
experimental group, acquisition trials consisted of baseline (20 s),
CS (8 s), US (30 s), and ITI (variable between 25 and 35 s).
The control group received the following sequence during the
acquisition trials: baseline (20 s), CS (8 s), ITI (25–35 s), and
US (30 s). Extinction trials consisted of baseline (20 s), CS (8 s),
and ITI (55–65 s) for both groups. Startle probes were applied
in every trial at random times between 6.5–7.5 s after CS onset,
between 21–23 s after US onset, and between 21–23 s after ITI
onset (Pappens et al., 2013). After the experimental phase of the
study participants were questioned about their knowledge of the
CS–US relationship.
Before leaving, participants were fully debriefed.
Response Definition, Scoring, and Statistical
Analysis
Startle eyeblink EMG data, SCRs and respiratory signals were
processed with PSychoPHysiological Analysis (PSPHA; De
Clerck et al., 2006).
The EMG response was calculated by subtracting the mean
baseline value (0–20 ms after probe onset) from the peak
value (between 21–175 ms after probe onset). Each startle
eyeblink was visually checked on artifacts. Distorted blinks or
trials with spontaneous blinks during baseline were removed
from the data. Rejected blinks (n = 11) were replaced by the
means of the previous and following trial. EMG data were
standardized and T-transformed within persons (Blumenthal
et al., 2005).
Respiratory rate (RR, in cycles per minute, cpm) and tidal
volume (VT, in ml) were extracted on a breath-by-breath
basis and then averaged across the CS episode, and across the
20 s baseline episode preceding the CS. Baseline values were
subtracted from CS values for statistical analysis.
Skin conductance responses were calculated by subtracting the
mean skin conductance level (SCL) during baseline (2 s before
the CS onset) from the maximum SCR during the subsequent 8 s
CS period. All SCRs below 0.05 were coded as a non-response
by setting them to zero and values were Log10 (SCR + 1)
transformed.
The mean of the online US-expectancy ratings (DIAL) were
calculated for the first and the last second of the CS presentation
per trial.
All data (EMG, RR, VT, SCR, DIAL) were averaged across
three pre-exposure trials and across every two subsequent trials in
acquisition and extinction, resulting in one pre-exposure block,
three acquisition blocks, and three extinction blocks.
Due to technical difficulties, the data of five participants
(two of the experimental group and three of the control group)
were excluded from all analyses, bringing the total number
of participants on 51. For DIAL and respiration, data of one
additional participant of the experimental group was lost due to
technical difficulties.
Potential pre-existing group differences were tested with a first
set of analyses on the pre-exposure data. Respiratory parameters
and SCR data were entered in a repeated measures ANOVA (RM
ANOVA) design with group (experimental/control) as a between
subject variable. Probe (CS/ITI) and Time (second 1, second 8)
were, respectively, added as within subject variables for startle
eyeblink EMG and DIAL.
The a priori hypotheses that served to examine whether
we could replicate the results of Pappens et al. (2013) were
analyzed in mixed ANOVA designs. Startle eyeblink EMG
data were entered in a group (experimental/control) × probe
(CS/ITI) × block (1, 2, 3) design. Respiratory parameters
and SCR data were entered in a design with group
(experimental/control) and block (1, 2, 3) as a between
subject and a within subject variable respectively. DIAL data
were entered in a group (experimental/control) × time (second
1, second 8) × block (1, 2, 3) design. Only acquisition data were
entered in the analyses – extinction data are depicted in the
figures for illustrative purposes only.
Participants were assigned to the ‘aware’ or ‘unaware’ group
based on the post-experimental assessment of awareness. We
opted to use this CS–US contingency awareness measure and not
the CS–US expectancy dial because it produced a discrete ‘YES’ or
‘NO’ awareness criterion. (Data of the CS–US expectancy dial are
more difficult to unambiguously categorize as aware/not aware in
a between-subject design and less clearly result in a dichotomy.
Former studies who did use online dial data for categorization
were within-subject paradigms; e.g., Schultz and Helmstetter,
2010).
Using the post-experimental CS–US contingency awareness
data, 35 of 51 included participants were labeled as ‘unaware’;
16 in the experimental group and 19 in the control group. For
DIAL and respiration, 34 ‘unaware’ and 16 ‘aware’ persons were
identified in the 50 included participants.
Hypotheses were tested also in the ‘unaware’ subgroup by
entering the data in a mixed ANOVA design with group
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(experimental/control) as a between-subject variable and block
(1, 2, 3) as a within-subject variable. Probe (CS/ITI) and Time
(Second 1, Second 8) were added as a within-subject variable for
the EMG and US-expectancy analyses, respectively.
Alpha was set at 0.05. Greenhouse–Geisser corrections were
applied where appropriate. Uncorrected degrees of freedom
and corrected ps are reported, together with η2p. Additional
testing of significant results were analyzed with two-tailed
planned comparisons. Statistical analyses for all measures were
accomplished with Statistical Version 12.
Results
Pre-Exposure
US-Expectancy
No effects involving the group factor were observed in US
expectation. Main effect of group: F(1,48) = 0.54, p = 0.47,
η2p = 0.01; group × time: F(1,48) = 0.54, p = 0.47, η2p = 0.01.
US-expectancy increased from second 1 to second 8; main
effect of time: F(1,48)= 22.88, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.32, see Figure 1.
Startle Eyeblink EMG
No a priori group differences were found in startle eyeblink data
during pre-exposure: group: F(1,49) = 0.94, p = 0.34, η2p = 0.02;
group × probe: F(1,49) = 0.88, n.s., η2p = 0.02, see Figure 2.
Respiratory Rate
As expected, the effect of group was not significant:
F(1,48) = 0.74, p = 0.40, η2p = 0.015, see Figure 3.
Tidal Volume (VT)
We observed no differences between the experimental and the
control group in VT during pre-exposure: F(1,48) = 0.14,
p = 0.71, η2p = 0.003. See Figure 4.
Skin Conductance Response
Although Figure 5 suggests that the experimental group
displayed higher SCRs during pre-exposure, such effect of group
was not significant: F(1,49) = 2.75, p = 0.10, η2p = 0.05.
Replication of Pappens et al. (2013)
US-Expectancy
No significant effects involving the group factor were observed
in US expectancy. Effect of group: F(1,48) = 2.69, p = 0.11,
η2p = 0.05; group × block: F(2,96) = 0.17, p = 0.85, η2p = 0.003;
group × time: F(1,48) = 0.12, p = 0.73, η2p = 0.003. The
critical group × block × time interaction was also not significant:
F(2,96) = 0.62, p = 0.54, η2p = 0.01.
Participants’ US expectancy increased from the first to the last
second of the CS; main effect of time: F(1,48) = 20.99, p < 001,
η2p = 0.30. Ratings also increased over blocks; main effect of
block: F(2,96) = 10.24, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.18. See Figure 1.
Startle Eyeblink EMG
Further testing of the significant probe x group interaction
[F(1,49) = 7.99, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.14] indicated that CS probes
evoked larger responses than ITI probes in the experimental
group, F(1,49) = 23.01, p < 0.001, but not in the control group,
F(1,49) = 0.73, p = 0.40.
The main effect of group was not significant, F(1,49) = 0.01,
p = 0.91, η2p = 0.00; nor was the block × group interaction,
F(2,98)= 1.07, p= 0.35, η2p = 0.02, or the probe× block × group
interaction, F(2,98) = 0.18, p = 0.83, η2p = 0.00.
We also observed a significant effect of probe: F(1,49)= 16.18,
p<0.01, η2p = 0.25. See Figure 2.
Respiratory Rate
Both the main effect of group and the group × block interaction
were not significant; F(1,48) = 0.89, p = 0.35, η2p = 0.02, and
F(2,96) = 1.13, p = 0.33, η2p = 0.02, respectively.
However, in line with results of Pappens et al. (2013) and
as suggested by Figure 3, two-tailed planned comparisons did
indicate that a linear decrease in RR in response to the CS
(change scores from baseline to CS) from the first to the last block
of acquisition was not significant for the experimental group,
F(1,48) = 0.10, p = 0.76, while it was for the control group,
F(1,48) = 5.18, p = 0.013 (see Figure 3). This effect was mainly
driven by an increase in RR in the control group during baseline
(data not presented).
Tidal Volume (VT)
No significant effects involving the group factor were observed:
group, F(1,48) = 0.58, p = 0.45, η2p = 0.01; group × block
interaction, F(2,96) = 2.09, p = 0.13, η2p = 0.04. See Figure 4.
Skin Conductance Response
No significant effects involving the group factor emerged for SCR;
group: F(1,49) = 1.29, p = 0.26, η2p = 0.03; group × block
interaction: F(2,98) = 0.11, p = 0.90, η2p = 0.002, see Figure 5.
Analysis on Subgroup of ‘Unaware’
Participants
US Expectancy
No differences in US expectancy were observed between the
experimental and the control group during acquisition. Effect
of group: F(1,32) = 0.94, p = 0.34, η2p = 0.03; group ×
time:, F(1,32) = 0.25, p = 0.62, η2p = 0.008; group × block:,
F(2,64) = 0.40, p = 0.67, η2p = 0.01; group × block × time:
F(2,64) = 1.27, p = 0.29, η2p = 0.04.
A significant main effect of time was present, F(1,32) = 22.88,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.42, with an increase in US expectancy
during the CS from second 1 to second 8; and also of block,
F(2,64) = 7.73, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.19, indicating that US
expectancy augmented across acquisition blocks. See Figure 8.
Startle Eyeblink EMG
Across acquisition, a decrease in startle responses during the
CS probe was observed for the control group, F(1,33) = 17.12,
p < 0.001, but not for the experimental group, F(1,33) = 0.75,
p = 0.39; significant group × probe × block interaction:
F(2,66) = 3.26, p = 0.04, η2p = 0.09.
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FIGURE 1 | Unconditioned stimulus (US)-expectancy during the
conditioned stimulus (CS)-period. Mean US-expectancy ratings of
second 1 and second 8 during the conditioned stimuli (CSs) on a
VAS-scale ranging from 0 (certainly no breathing resistance) to 100
(certainly breathing resistance) for the experimental and the control
group. Responses were averaged across three pre-exposure trials
(PE), two acquisition trials (A1, A2, A3) and two extinction trials
(E1, E2, E3).
FIGURE 2 | Startle eyeblink responses electromyographic (EMG). Mean EMG-responses (T-scores) during the CS and during ITI for the experimental and the
control group. Startle eyeblink responses were averaged across three pre-exposure trials (PE), two acquisition trials (A1, A2, A3) and two extinction trials (E1, E2, E3).
Also the two-way interactions were significant; probe × group
interaction: F(1,33) = 4.69, p = 0.04, η2p = 0.12, and
block × group interaction: F(2,66) = 5.56, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.14.
Finally, probes administered during the CS evoked stronger
startle responses than those during ITI; main effect of probe:
F(1,33) = 10.7, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.24). See Figure 6.
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FIGURE 3 | Change in respiratory rate (RR). Mean changes in RR (in cycles per minute, cpm) during the CS relative to baseline (CS minus baseline) for the
experimental and the control group. Respiratory responses were averaged across three pre-exposure trials (PE), two acquisition trials (A1, A2, A3) and two extinction
trials (E1, E2, E3).
FIGURE 4 | Change in Tidal Volume (VT). Mean changes in VT (in ml) during the CS relative to baseline (CS minus baseline) for the experimental and the control
group. Respiratory responses were averaged across three pre-exposure trials (PE), two acquisition trials (A1, A2, A3), and two extinction trials (E1, E2, E3).
Respiratory Rate
We observed no differences in RR between the experimental and
the control group. Effect of Group: F(1,32) = 1.91, p = 0.18,
η2p = 0.06. Group × Block interaction: F(2,64) = 1.26, p = 0.29,
η2p = 0.04.
However, in line with our results in the total group sample,
we did observe a linear decrease in RR across acquisition
blocks in the control group: F(1,32) = 5.83, p = 0.02, but
not in the experimental group: F(1,32) = 0.01, p = 0.91,
see Figure 7. Again, this effect was driven by an increase
in RR in the control group during baseline (data not
presented).
Tidal Volume (VT)
No significant effects involving the group factor were
observed in VT.
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FIGURE 5 | Skin conductance responses (SCR) during the CS-period. Mean SCRs [LOG10 (1 + SCR)] in microSiemens during the CSs. SCRs were averaged
across three pre-exposure trials (PE), two acquisition trials (A1, A2, A3), and two extinction trials (E1, E2, E3).
FIGURE 6 | Startle eyeblink responses in unaware participants (EMG). Mean EMG-responses (T-scores) during the CS and during ITI for the experimental and
the control group. Startle eyeblink responses were averaged across two acquisition trials (A1, A2, A3).
Effect of Group: F(1,32) = 0.45, p = 0.50, η2p = 0.01.
Group × Block interaction: F(2,64) = 0.9, p = 0.41,
η2p = 0.03.
Skin Conductance Response
No significant effects involving the group factor were observed
during acquisition: main effect of Group, F(1,33) = 1.3, p = 0.26,
η2p = 0.04; Group × Block: F(2,66) = 0.46, p = 0.63, η2p = 0.01.
Discussion
The aim of the current study was to examine the relationship
between interoceptive fear conditioning and CS–US contingency
awareness. To this end we first sought to replicate the results
of a previous study (Pappens et al., 2013) that suggested fear
learning had occurred without declarative knowledge of the CS–
US relationship. Second, we aimed to examine fear learning in the
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FIGURE 7 | Change in RR in unaware participants. Mean changes in RR (in cycles per minute, cpm) during the CS relative to baseline (CS minus baseline) for
the experimental and the control group. Respiratory responses were averaged across two acquisition trials (A1, A2, A3).
FIGURE 8 | US-expectancy during the CS-period in the subgroup of unaware participants. Mean US-expectancy ratings of second 1 and second 8 during
the CS on a VAS-scale ranging from 0 (certainly no heavy breathing resistance) to 100 (certainly heavy breathing resistance) for the experimental and the control
group during the three acquisition blocks (A1, A2, A3).
subgroup of CS–US unaware participants. Our design consisted
of the administration of six explicitly paired presentations of
mild breathlessness (CS) followed by strong dyspnea (US) in the
experimental group while the control group received the same
number of CSs and USs in an explicitly unpaired fashion. Our
measures included startle eyeblink EMG, respiratory parameters,
skin conductance, a continuous US expectancy measure and
a discrete post-experimental CS–US contingency assessment.
Based on Pappens et al. (2013), we predicted to observe a
dissociation in fear outcomes, that is, fear learning (or: group)
effects in startle potentiation and respiration, but not in self-
reported US-expectancy. We expected the same pattern to occur
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in a subgroup of participants who failed to verbalize the CS–US
relationship at the end of the experiment.
Our findings confirm that a mild respiratory sensation
can acquire fear-evoking properties because of its predictive
relationship with an aversive respiratory event. These results
corroborate earlier findings demonstrating interoceptive fear
conditioning (Acheson et al., 2007, 2012; Pappens et al., 2012,
2014) and they successfully replicate the data of Pappens et al.
(2013). Most importantly, we replicated the expected dissociation
of the dependent measures: during acquisition experimental and
control group differed in fear responding both in startle eyeblink
EMG and respiratory measures, but not in US expectancy.
In the second part of this study we examined the relationship
between fear learning and declarative knowledge of the CS–
US relationship in a more direct way by selecting a subgroup
of participants who could not correctly report this relationship
despite 100% explicit contingent presentations of CS and US.
Despite the absence of propositional knowledge and the lack
of fear conditioning effects in US-expectancy, they did display
fear learning in startle eyeblink responses and – to a lesser
extent – in RR. These results demonstrate fear acquisition
without declarative knowledge of the CS–US relationship.
In contrast to Pappens et al. (2013), the current study
did include a SCR measurement, but we failed to observe
conditioning effects in SCR. Several authors have argued that
fear conditioned changes in SCR, just as US-expectancy, may
primarily reflect propositional learning (declarative knowledge of
the CS–US contingency), whereas startle eyeblink potentiation
more directly reflects subcortical emotional learning that can
dissociate from propositional learning (e.g., Hamm and Vaitl,
1996; Öhman and Mineka, 2001; Weike et al., 2007; Soeter and
Kindt, 2010). However, previous experiments generated mixed
results as to whether conditioning of SCR requires ‘conscious’
knowledge of the CS–US relationship (Hamm and Vaitl, 1996;
Purkis and Lipp, 2001; Lovibond and Shanks, 2002; Hamm and
Weike, 2005; Weike et al., 2007; Sevenster et al., 2014) or whether
‘unconscious’ fear learning also results in conditioned SCRs
(Bechara et al., 1995; Knight et al., 2003; Schultz and Helmstetter,
2010). Our results rather support the former hypothesis: we did
not observe learning effects in SCR in a group that failed to learn
declarative knowledge of the CS–US relationship.
For several reasons, the present interoceptive fear
conditioning paradigm seems especially apt for the experimental
study of panic. First, 40% of panic attacks are described as coming
‘out of the blue’ (Shulman et al., 1994) although the efficacy of
exposure therapy suggests that panic attacks are conditioned
events triggered by a cue (McHugh et al., 2009; Meuret et al.,
2011). The dissociation observed in our data can offer a nice
framework for understanding this apparent paradox. Despite
being unable to verbalize the CS–US relationship, participants
did display conditioned defensive fear responses. For this reason,
our interoceptive fear conditioning paradigm could represent a
strong tool for the further study of unexpected panic.
Second, clinically, the dissociation we observed in fear
measures could offer an explanation for the high relapse rate
observed in anxiety patients after exposure therapy (Vervliet
et al., 2013): although verbal assessment indicated their fear had
disappeared, residual fear might still have been present at the end
of therapy, precipitating the recovery of fear at a later instance.
The dissociation observed in our data and the failure of total fear
extinction observed in startle eyeblinks in the experimental group
(Pappens et al., 2013) shows that our paradigm could serve to
study the phenomenon of return of fear.
Third, the fact that we installed fear learning to a fear relevant
respiratory sensation is of special interest for the study of panic.
In the phenomenology of panic, next to cardiac sensations,
respiratory symptoms are prevalent (e.g., Ley, 1989; Briggs et al.,
1993; Klein, 1993; Kircanski et al., 2009; Meuret et al., 2011)
and seem vulnerable for fear conditioning processes. This may
be related to the fact that both response systems produce strong
internal sensations that may enter awareness and that both are
referring to vital functions, the failure of which may represent
a sudden life threatening experience causing fear of imminent
death. Last, this study represents a successful replication of
an earlier experiment (Pappens et al., 2013) corroborating the
usefulness of this paradigm as a source of stable and reliable
results.
Most studies that reported unconscious fear learning
manipulated the level of awareness experimentally by adding
a distractor task (e.g., Smith et al., 2005; Tabbert et al., 2006,
2011; Weike et al., 2007), through subliminal conditioning
(Öhman and Soares, 1998; Raes et al., 2010) or by obscuring
discriminability between the danger and the safety cue (Knight
et al., 2003; Schultz and Helmstetter, 2010). Proponents of a
single process theory refuted these results based on the lack
of a consensus concerning the criteria used to determine the
effectiveness of blocking a stimulus from awareness (Sebastiani
et al., 2011). A strength of our study is that it created a
dissociation without the inclusion of an awareness manipulation.
It would, however, be presumptuous to interpret our data as
strong evidence for a dual process theory of fear learning since
it cannot be excluded that one measure (e.g., the startle eyeblink
response) might be more sensitive than another one (e.g., SCR
or US expectancy), yet still reflect the same, single learning
process. Our data do suggest that different response systems can
at least have different activation thresholds in the learning of the
contingency between CS and US.
A first limitation of our study is that the effects obtained
are rather small. Interoceptive fear conditioning seems overall
difficult to install with a homoreflexive paradigm, i.c., a design
in which CS and US share the same response system and
have similar initial sensory properties (Dworkin, 2000). Future
studies should thus focus on the identification of individuals
that are more prone to develop fear for harmless interoceptive
sensations. For example, we demonstrated that persons scoring
high on Fear of Suffocation (a subscale of the Claustrophobia
Questionnaire) are more vulnerable for maladaptive breathing
during obstructed breathing (Pappens et al., 2013). Also,
Melzig et al. (2011) demonstrated that people who score
high on Anxiety Sensitivity, are more sensitive to respiratory
cues.
Second, since an increase of US expectancy was already
present during pre-exposure it is possible that later fear learning
effects in US expectancy were masked due to ceiling effects.
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The increase during pre-exposure is in line with previous
results (Pappens et al., 2013) and is likely caused by the
inherent relatedness of the mild resistive load (applied as
CS) and the breathing occlusion (applied as US). Based on
the findings of another study, we have recently argued that
pre-existing expectations about the CS–US relationship may
indeed hamper detecting the true contingencies (Schroijen et al.,
2015).
In summary, this study successfully installed interoceptive fear
to mild dyspnea. Fear learning was observed in startle blink
EMG and respiratory measures but not in US expectancy and
SCR. The same pattern of results was observed in subgroup
of participants who failed to acquire declarative knowledge of
the CS–US relationship. We propose that our interoceptive fear
learning paradigm might serve as an ecologically valid laboratory
model for unexpected panic.
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